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[Crim. No. 5643. In Bank. Apr. 8, 1955.1

In re WARREN E. BARTGES, on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Evidenc&-3'udicial Notice-Laws of Sister States.-In view
of requirement of Code Civ. Pro c., § 1875, subd. 3, that judicial
notice be taken of statutory definition of crime in sister state,
it is mistake for appellate court to state that, there being no
evidence to contrary, it will be assumed that law with respect
to crimes charged as prior convictions in sister states is same
as it is in California.
[i] Habeas Oorpus-Grounds for Relief-Excess of Jurisdiction.Petitioner's contention on habeas corpus that judgments against
him in consolidated criminal cases were incorrect and beyond
power of superior court to make (and District Court of Appeal
to affirm) in determining that two of three prior convictions
(the charges of which had been dismissed) are true, is
moot where, after filing of petition for habeas corpus,
District Court of Appeal recalled its remittitur and modified
trial court's jUdgments so as to recite only one prior conviction, and sheriff then filed supplemental return which shows
that petitioner is held under modified c.bstra(!t of judgments
which show only one prior conviction, since he has secured
relief in that respect to which he was entitled.
(Sl Oriminal Law-Habitual 01fenders-Review.-Where defendant was sentenced to serve consecutive terms on two primary
counts of which he was found guilty, but court incorrectly
found that defendant suffered three alleged prior convictions,
the charges of two of which had been dismissed and were unsupported by proof, it cannot be said on habeas corpus that
trial court's unwarranted determination as to number of prior
eonvictions did not influence it in sentencing defendant to
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 27 i Am.Jur., Evidence, § 47.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Evidence, § 37; [2] Habeas Corpus,
19; [3] Criminal Law, § H59; [4] Criminal Law, §§ 998, 1485;
(6} Habeas Corpua, § 2; (6, 7] Habeas Corpus, § 6S.
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consecutive rather than concurrent terms, especially where
District Court of Appeal on affirming jUdgments of conviction
specifically relied on mistaken assumption that defendant was
shown to have been convicted of at least three prior felonies.
ld.-Probation-Review: Punishment-Concurrent and Cumulative Sentences.- Where District Court of Appeal has modified
consecutive sentence judgmcnts in two consolidated criminal
cases by striking out findings of two prior convictions, defendant's right to have trial court determine on corrected
record whether probation shall be granted or denied and
whether sentences, if reimposed, shall run cumulatively or
concurrently is substantial one, and inasmuch as statutes
(Pen. Code, §§ 669, 1203; see also Pen. Code, §§ 1213, 1213.5,
3021, 3024, 3024.5, 3043) vest power to make such determinations in trial court, District Court of Appeal as reviewing
court does not have power to determine on changed record
whether probation shall be granted or denied and whether
sentences shall run concurrently or cumulatively, but must
remand cause to trial court for such determinations and appropriate proceedings.
Habeas Corpus-Function of Writ.-Function of writ of
habeas corpus is solely to effect "discharge" from unlawful
restraint, though illegality in respect to which discharge from
restraint is sought may not go to fact of continued detention
but may be simply as to circumstances under which prisoner
is held.
ld. - Judgment - Discharge.-A prisoner may be discharged
from illegal conditions of restraint although not from all restraint. (See Pen. Code, §§ 1484, 1493.)
ld.-Judgment-Discharge.-A writ of habeas corpus may be
granted, not to discharge petitioner from custody of sheriff
but to discharge him only from illegal circumstances of his
restraint and to order his production before superior court
80 that he may be dealt with according to law as person
properly convicted of, but not yet properly sentenced for,
substantive crimes charged in informations and only one of
three alleged prior convictions, after modification of judgment
by District Court of Appeal.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from
custody. Writ granted, not to discharge petitioner from
custody of sheriff, but to discharge him from illegal circumstances of his restraint and to order his production before
superior court so that he may properly be dealt with according to law.
[5] See Cal.Jur., Habeas Corpus, § 2 i Am. Jur., Habeas Corpus,
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Lowell Lyons for Petitioner.

S. Ernest Roll, District Attorney (Los Angeles), Jere J.
Sullivan and Robert Wheeler, Deputy District Attorneys, for
Respondent.

)

)

SCHAUER, J.-In this habeas corpus proceeding the ultimate que~tion is whether the District Court of Appeal, after
modifying consecutive sentence judgments in two consolidated
criminal cases by striking out findings of two prior convictions,
has power to itself implicitly determine upon the changed
record whether probation shall be granted or denied and
whether the sentences shall run cumulatively or concurrently,
or must remand the cause to the trial court for such determinations and appropriate proceedings. We conclude that
petitioner is entitled to the writ, not to be discharged from
custody of the sheriff but to be produced in the superior
court for proceedings appropriate to the state of the record
as hereinafter explained.
Petitioner was convicted of one count of grand theft and
one count of forgery and it was found that he had suffered
three prior convictions of felony. Probation was denied; the
judgments which were thereupon entered recited the three
prior convictions and ordered that the sentences run con·
secutively. Defendant appealed and the District Court of
Appeal affirmed the judgments in People v. Bartges (1954),
126 Cal.App.2d 763, 776 [273 P.2d 49], holding in substance,
tnter alia, that "Since appellant was shown to have been
l!onvicted of at least three prior felonies" it could not be
said that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
probation and in ordering that the sentences run consecutively. There was no petition for rehearing or for a hearing
in this court, and the judgment of the District Court of
Appeal became final.
After petitioner had filed the petition for habeas corpus
which is now before this court, the District Court of Appeal
recalled its remittitur and modified the trial court's judgments to recite only one prior conviction. However, it did
not remand the cause for determination by the trial court
as to whether upon the changed record probation should be
granted or denied, and whether, if reimposed, the sentences
should run concurrently or consecutively, and for resentencing, if and as appropriate. Instead, the District Court of
Appeal affirmed the judgments as modified by it. (People v.
Bart{Jes (1954), 128 Cal.App.2d 496 [275 P.2d 518].1
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Petitioner (subject to bail as fixed by the superior court)
is in the custody of the sheriff of Los Angeles County and
stay of execution has been granted by the superior court
"to the time when the application to the State Supreme Court
has been determined and to the time within which an appeal
to the United States Supreme Court may be perfected."
Petitioner complains that the trial court's determination
that his sentences should run consecutively rather than concurrently was based on its mistaken belief as to the number
of prior convictions which he has suffered. The record
supports this contention to the extent and for the reasons
hereinafter stated. Petitioner further contends that the trial
court violated due process by upholding the refusal of a
witness, called by petitioner, to testify on the ground tllat
he might incriminate himself (U.S. Const., Amendment V;
Cal. Const., art. I, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 2065). This
contention was correctly disposed of on petitioner's appeal
from the judgments of conviction (People v. Bartges (1954),
supra, 126 Cal.App.2d 763).
The judgments of conviction recited that "the Court • • •
found allegations of prior convictions . . . true, to-wit:
Arson, a felony [in Oregon in 1932] •.. ; Larceny and Lareeny by Bailee, felonies [in Oregon in 1941], . . . Grand
Theft, a felony [in Arizona in 1949]," with service of terms
in the respective state prisons. Before the District Court
of Appeal petitioner contended, among otller things, tllat
two of tile prior convictions were not proved. As petitioner
points out, although exemplified copies of the Oregon conviction of larceny and larceny by bailee and of the Arizona
conviction of grand theft were produced by the prosecuting
attorney and numbered for identification, such copies were
not offered or received in evidence; instead, tile prosecuting
attorney moved "to dismiss the second and third prior convictions as alleged in tile information" and the trial court
granted the motion. The District Court of Appeal, perhaps
misled by the fact that the index to the reporter's transcript
mistakenly show~ that such ex('mplificd copics were in evidence,
and not having had its attention directed to the fact of dismissal, and presuming the judgments to be correct, rejected
the contention of petitioner that the prior convictions had
not been established (pp. 774-776 of 126 Cal.App.2d).
The reason for the prosecuting attorney's not offering
evidence of the two prior convictions, and for moving to

)
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dismiss the charges, was stated by him at the trial. He
seems to have been of the opinion that the prior convictions
should not be charged and proved because they were adjudications that the defendant had committed acts which, had
they been committed in California, would not have amounted
to grand theft as defined by the law of this state (theft of
money or property of a value exceeding $200 [Pen. Code,
§ 487] ). This appears from the statement of the prosecuting
attorney that "I understand now that the dividing line
between petty theft and grand theft in Arizona is $50.00
and in Oregon the dividing line is $35.00, so although those
would stand as felony convictions in the other States, they
would not be felony convictions in California." [1] AIthougn this court, as required by statute since 1927 (Stats.
1927, p. 110; Code Civ. Proc., § 1875, subd. 3), takes judicial
notice of the statutory definition of a crime in a sister state
(see In re McVickers (1946), 29 Cal.2d 264, 278 [176 P.2d
40] ), the District Court of Appeal did not judicially notice
the Oregon and Arizona statutory delineations between grand
and petty theft referred to in the quoted statement of'the
prosecuting attorney; it mistakenly said (p. 775 of 126 Cal.
App.2d), "There being no evidence to the contrary, it will
be assumed that the law with respect to the crimes charged
as prior convictions in the sister states is the same as it is
in California."
After the decision of the District Court of Appeal became
final petitioner filed the petition for habeas corpus which
is now before us. He contends, in effect, that the superior
court exceeded its jurisdiction in finding him guilty of two
prior convictions the charges of which had been dismissed
and which were not supported by proof, and that the District
Court of Appeal likewise exceeded its jurisdiction in affirming those judgments. He points to the District Court's holdings that" Since appellant was shown to have been convicted
of Lt least three prior felonies it cannot be said that in
imposing consecutive sentences herein the court was improperly influenced to the prejudice of appellant by the
prior conviction of larceny by bailee in the State of Oregon,"
and that "we cannot say that the denial of probation under
such circumstances, amounted to an abuse of discretion"
(p. 776 of 126 Cal.App.2d). This court issued an order to
show cause, and the sheriff filed his return.
Thereafter the attorney general advised the District Court

...
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of Appeal of an entry in the clerk's transcript on appeal
which apparently had not been previously directed to the
attention of that court by either party to the appeal. Such
entry shows that during the trial "Motion of the District
Attorney to dismiss the second and third prior convictions
as alleged in the information is granted." The District Court
of Appeal (People v. Bartges (1954), supra, 128 Cal.App.2d
496, 498) determined that "A mistake of fact on the part of
an appellate tribunal which results in prejudicial error or a
miscarriage of justice affords a proper ground for recall and
correction of the remittitur [citations] . . . Since the motion
to dismiss the last two prior convictions was granted by the
trial court and was not brought to the attention of this court
prior to rendition of its decision affirming the judgments
containing a finding that all three priors charged were true,
we are persuaded that such decision being inadvertently
rendered under a mistake of fact entitles us to take such
steps as are necessary to bring into agreement the facts and
the law."
The District Court of Appeal recalled its remittitur. It
noted the fact that petitioner urged "that the improper
finding of three prior convictions resulted in improper imposition of consecutive sentences" and modified its original
order of full affirmance to provide that "The judgments
are modified by striking therefrom the finding of the truth
of the second and third prior conviction rsic]," but, as hereinabove indicated, instead of thereupon reversing the judgments and remanding the cause to the trial court for determination of the questions as to whether, with the findings a..CJ
to the two prior convictions stricken out, probation should
be granted or denied and whether the sentences, if to be
reimposed, should run cumulatively or concurrently, it impliedly and implicitly undertook to itself make those determinations by ordering that "as so modified the judgment
and order are affirmed." (People v. Bartges (1954), supra,
128 Cal.App.2d 496, 497-498.)
[2] The sheriff then filed a supplemental return which
shows that petitioner is held under a modified abstract of
judgments which show only one prior conviction (of arson).
Therefore, petitioner's contention that the judgments were
incorrect and beyond the power of the superior court to
make (and the District Conrt of Appeal to affirm) in determining that the two prior convictions last recited therein
(the charges of which had been dismissed) are true, has
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become moot in that he has secured the relief in that respect
to which he was entitled.
Petitioner still complains, however, that the trial court
must be understood to have been influenced to some extent
in ordering that the sentences run consecutively by its
mistaken belief that he had suffered three prior convictions
of crimes which, if committed in California, would have
amounted to felonies, and that the issue on this matter is
not moot. The record and the law support petitioner in this
contention. [3] As this court has previously held, it cannot.
be said that the trial court's unwarranted determination as
to the number of prior convictions of felony did not influence
it in sentencing petitioner to consecutive rather than concurrent terms. (People v. Morton (1953).41 Ca1.2d 536. 545
[261 P.2d 523].) Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, the
District Court of Appeal in disposing of certain of petitioner's contentions adversely to him specifically relied upon
the mistaken" assumption that petitioner "was shown to have
been oonvicted of at least three prior felonies JI (p. 776 of
126 Cal.App.2d). [4] The right of petitioner to have the
trial court determine upon the corrected record whether probation shall be granted or denied and whet.her the sentences.
if reimposed, shall run cumulatively or concurrently is a
substantial one. Inasmuch as the statutes (Pen. Code,
§§ 1203; 669; see also id., §§ 1213; 1213.5; 3021; 3024; 3024.5;
3043) vest the power to make such determinations in the
trial court and as the District Court of Appeal was acting
only as a reviewing court, we conclude that the latter court
exceeded its power and that the writ should issue for the
purposes hereinafter specified.
As indicated above, the petition for habeas corpus raises
the further contention that petitioner was denied a fair trial
in that the trial court refused to compel one Forrest Jameson
to testify when called as a witness for petitioner. Jameson
was jointly charged with petitioner with grand theft. His
trial had been severed. He refused to testify on the ground
that any evidence which he gave might tend to incriminate
him. Petitioner presents no argument in this connection
which would entitle him to relief on habeas corpus or which
was not disposed of by the District Court of Appeal in
People v. Bartges (1954), supra, 126 Cal.App.2d 763, 771-774.
A question remains as to the form and substance of the
order to be made in this case. [5,6] In construIng the
meaning of the word "discharging" as used in section 1506 of
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the Penal Code l this court has recently noted that "The
function of the writ of habeas corpus is solely to effect 'discharge' from unlawful restraint, though the illegality in
respect to which the discharge from restraint is sought may
not go to the fact of continued detention but may be simply
as to the circumstances under which the prisoner is held"
and that he "may be discharged from illegal conditions of
restraint although not from all restraint." (In re Ohessman (1955), ante, pp. 1, 5, 6 [279 P.2d 24] ; see a1so Pen.
Code, § 1484 [" The court • • • must • • . dispose of such
party [petitioner] as the justice of the case may require"] ;
id., § 1493 ["In cases where any party is held under
illegal restraint or custody . . . the . . . court may order such
party to be committed to the restraint or custody of such
person as is by law entitled thereto"] ; In re McOoy (1945),
32 Ca1.2d 73, 77 [194 P.2d 531, 11 A.L.R.2d 934]; In re
James (1952), 38 Ca1.2d 302, 313-314 [240 P.2d 596].) Upon
initial consideration of the petition for the writ of habeas
corpus we issued not the writ but an order to show cause
why the relief prayed for should not be granted. The sheriff
made his return to such order and the parties have stipulated
that the petition for the writ shall be treated as a traverse
to the return of the respondent sheriff. We also treat the
return of the sheriff to the order to show cause as a return
to the writ which is to be granted. [7] We have concluded
that the writ should be granted, not to discharge the petitioner from custody of the sheriff but to discharge him from
only the illegal circumstances of his restraint which have
been depicted above and to order his production before the
superior court so that he may be dealt with according to
law as a pl'rSOll properly cOllvicted of, but not yet properly
sentcneed for, the substantive crimes charged in the informations in Los Angcl('s Superior Court criminal cases Number
155767 and Number 155768 and the first, and only the
first, prior cOllviction allegcd in each of the above numbered
informations.
For the reasons hereinabove stated, the petition for the
writ of habeas corpus is granted and the petitioner is remanded
to the custody of the sheriff of the county of Los Angeles
to be brought before the superior court in that county to
lSection 1506 provides that: ' 'An appeal may be taken . . • by the
people from a final order of a superior court made upon the return of a
writ of habeas corpus discharging a defendant after his conviction in all

criminal easea • • ."
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be dealt with according to law as a person validly and finally
convicted of, but not since the modifications of the record
as to prior convictions sentenced for, the substantive crimes
charged in the informations in Los Angeles Superior Court
criminal cases Number 155767 and Number 155768, and found
to have been prevIously convicted of, and to have served a
term in a state prison for, one, and only one, prior conviction
of felony, to wit, arson, a felony (in Oregon), as alleged
in the information in each of the above numbered cases.
Upon production of the petitioner in the superior court
as above ordered that court shall proceed to arraign him
for judgment upon the record as amended by the order of
the District Court of Appeal in People v. Barlges (1954),
128 Cal.App.2d 496, 497-498 [275 P.2d 518]. Upon such
arraignment the superior court will have power to consider,
and "in its discretion to grant or deny, an application for
11robation, if petitioner so requests, and will have power, and
the duty if it determiues that judgments shall again be pronounced, to direct whether the sentences shall run cumulativelyor concurrently.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred..

)

)

TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
Petitioner was convicted of one count of forgery and one
count of grand theft, and it was found in the judgment of
conviction that he had suffered three prior felony convictions,
although two of the three priors charged against him had
been dismissed on motion of the district attorney before the
case was submitted to the jury. Probation was denied, and
it was ordered that the sentences on the primary counts should
run consecutively. Petitioner appealed. The judgment was
affirmed and became final. (People v. Badges, 126 Cal.
App.2d 763 [273 P.2d 49]. No petition for hearing was
filed in this court.) Petitioner then applied to this court for
a writ of habeas corpus, and we issued an order to show
cause why the writ should not issue. Thereafter, the District
Court of Appeal was apprised of the fact that two of the
three priors charged had been dismissed and on grounds of
mistake it recalled the remittitur and modified the judgment
of conviction by striking therefrom the finding that petitioner
had suffered two of the three prior felony convictions. The
judgment, as modified, was affirmed. (People v. Bartges,
128 Cal.App.2d 496 [275 P.2d 518].) Thus, the judgment
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no longer finds petitioner guilty of a charge not contained in
the information.
The controlling question in this habeas corpus proceeding
is whether the District Court of Appeal acted in excess of its
jurisdiction in affirming the judgment as modified rather
than reversing it insofar as it imposed consecutive terms of
imprisonment. Although the trial court, in denying petitioner's application for probation and in sentencing him to
consecutive terms on the primary offenses, might have been
influenced by the mistaken belief that he "'ad suffered three
prior felony convictions and although the District Court of
Appeal ~ould have reversed the judgment with directions to
l'e::;entence petitioner and to reconsider his application for
probation in the light of the corrected judgment (see People v.
Morton, 41 Ca1.2d 536, 545 [261 P.2d 523), I do not believe
that if the District Court of Appeal erred in affirming the
judgment as modified, its error was jurisdictional.
It is not suggested that the claimed error in the present
case raises any constitutional or other question of extraordinary importance that would justify departure from the usual
limitation that the writ of habeas corpus can be used only
as a test of jurisdiction. (See In re Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488,
492-495 [122 P.2d 22] ; In re Trombley, 31 Ca1.2d 801, 812
[193 P.2d 734].) Thus, if a sentence is within the power
of the trial court and the judgment is regular on its face,
the fact that under the circumstances the sentence may be
unduly severe cannot be inquired into by a writ of habeas
corpus. (In re Marley, 29 Ca1.2d 525, 531 [175 P.2d 832] ;
Ex Parte Miller, 89 Cal. 41, 42 [26 P. 620] ; In re Nicholson,
24 Cal.App.2d 15, 16-17 [74 P.2d 288]; In re Azevedo, 42
Cal.App. 662, 663 l183 P. 952] ; see also In re Pedrini, 33
Cal.2d 876, 878 [206 P.2d 699}.)
It is within the discretion of the trial court to direct that
a defendant, who has been found guilty of the offense charged
against him, be denied probation (Pen. Code, § 1203) and
that he serve consecutive sentences (Pen. Code, § 669). The
denial of probation and the imposition of consecutive sentences on petitioner were therefore within the power of the
trial court even though it might have erred in exercising its
diseretion. On appl·al. tl}(~ District Court of Appeal had
power to "reverse. amrm. or modify" the judgment. (Pen.
Code, § 1260; People v. Craig. 17 Cal.2d 453. 458 [110 P.2d
403].) It did modify anu affirm and, even if it erred in
affirming mthcl' rhan rt'Yc!'sillg' with directions to resentence,
it did not "exceed its power" in doing so.
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At most, the District Court of AppeaJ erred in applying
the provisions of article VI, section 4%, of the California Constitution by failing to reverse the judgment with directions
to resentence petitioner and to reconsider his application
for probation in the light of the corrected judgment. If
the propriety of an appellate court's application of article
VI, section 4%, can be questioned by a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, then a great number of this court '8 rulings
on questions of prejudicial error will be subject to further
review and the finality of criminal judgments will be seriously
impaired.
Moreover, at the time the District Court of Appeal recalled
the remittitur,· the attorney general, in his "Suggestion of
Grounds For Recall of Remittitur," raised the question of
the propriety of modifying the judgment without reversing
for reconsideration of petitioner's application for probation
and resentencing on the basis of the judgment as modified.
Counsel for petitioner was served with a copy of this document, but made no reply, and failed to petition for a rehearing
in the District Court of Appeal or to file a petition for hearing
in this court after the District Court of Appeal had filed its
opinion modifying and affirming the judgment of conviction.
Petitioner has not offered any excuse for his failure to exhaust
his remedies by way of appeal. "The general rule is that
habeas corpus cannot serve as a substitute for an appeal,
and, in the absence of special circumstances constituting an
excuse for failure to employ that remedy, the writ will not
lie where the claimed errors could have been, but were not,
raised upon a timely appeal from a judgment of conviction.
[Citations.] " (In re Dixon, 41 Ca1.2d 756, 759 [264 P.2d
513] .)
I would deny the writ.
Edmonds, J'J and Spence, J'J concurred.

-For the purposes of our decision in the present habeas corpus proceeding, the fact that the District Court of Appeal recalled the remittitur
Dnd modified the judgment has no more effect than if the judgment as
thus modified had been entered originally. See In re Rothrock, 14 Cal.2d
a4, a9 [92 P.2d 634].
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